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"PERFECT GOOD FAITH"*
Erin Ruble and Gerald Torres**
The question we are addressing in this essay is one that has bedeviled the
evolution of Indian law from the beginning. How is colonialism to be recon-
ciled with republican constitutionalism? We do not anticipate that we will be
able to resolve the problems we surface, but we hope that we can, at minimum,
provide another way of looking at the role of Indians in the evolution of Ameri-
can law and the troubling place that international legal ideas have played in the
creation and assignment of a constitutional space for tribes and Indian people.
We will make this inquiry within the context of two land disputes. The disputes
lead us to quite different conclusions and reveal, we hope, the ways in which
there can be no simple solution to the problem of domesticating international
law within the context of Indian law, although it must remain a first question
within it.
We begin with a discussion of the idea of unenumerated powers within the
federal constitutional structure. We make the rather unexceptionable argument
that the relationship between tribes and the states played a pivotal role in the
evolution of the relationship between the federal government and the states.
This relationship depended not so much on the allocation of powers as found in
the text of the constitution, as on the structure of government the constitution
required. Moreover, the international legitimacy of the rather radical experi-
ment represented by the federal government depended, in large measure, on the
powers asserted by the federal government in its management of Indian affairs.
Indian affairs gave the central government primary authority over both security
and foreign relations by excluding Indians from the polity, but it also asserted
exclusive authority to deal with Indians and tribes to the exclusion of the con-
stitutive states of the Union and the great colonial powers of Europe.'
* The title is taken from an infamous line in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567
(1903). "We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in dealing with the
Indians." The arguments advanced in the first section of this essay are their preliminary
expression. They are developed further in a forthcoming essay.
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for her support and encouragement. Erin Ruble J.D., University of Texas 2003, she would
like to thank Benjamin Putnam for his support.
As we will discuss later, the clear expression of this important relationship with European
great powers was not reserved for Indian affairs, but arose squarely within the context of
colonialism. Thus, President Monroe clearly stated what came to be called The Monroe
Doctrine during his seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823:
At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor
residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United
States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of
the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by
His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to.
The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifest-
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II. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A NATION
Virtually everyone who studies Indian law begins with the so-called Mar-
shall Trilogy2 and it is for good reason. The trilogy (Johnson v. M'Intosh,
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, and Worcester v. State of Georgia) sets
out the basic structure that has guided the development of Indian law (often by
negative example) and it also provides a way of talking about Indian law that
the doctrine reflects. Unfortunately, the way the courts have adopted the
nomenclature of those cases often elides the radical shifts in Indian policy that
belie the foundational structure of the original cases. 3 Words that have a techni-
cal meaning are often reduced to their everyday usage4 or a usage derived from
another area of law that flattens the complex relationship suggested by both
Marshall's opinions, but equally importantly, by the interplay of the various
opinions within each case and between the cases.' Reading the cases, especially
those with multiple opinions, reveals a complex and divisive set of views con-
cerning both the juridical status of the tribes as well as the empirical foundation
for any claims made either for or about them. The background for the argu-
ments was the status of the central government itself.
It is useful to remember that what made the emergence of the United
States so threatening to the great powers of Europe was that it turned the ques-
tion of legitimacy inside out. As Professor Bobbitt puts it: "For the Americans,
sovereignty itself was to be limited and the rights retained by the People were
infinitely numbered." 6 The federal government was to be a government of lim-
ited powers, those ceded to it by the states and those necessitated by the struc-
ture of sovereign relationships contemplated by the design of the constitution.
Yet if the legitimacy of the United States was still in question, then the first
tasks of the central court was to sketch out the implied relationships and to
locate, in law, the contours of the essential unenumerated powers. But where
was the law to come from? It is not enough to say that the states necessarily
ing the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their
solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which
this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has
been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United
States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colo-
nization by any European powers ....
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/monroe.htm (on file with Avalon Project of
the Yale Law School).
2 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
3 For an excellent discussion of the use and misuse of the Marshallian structure see, Philip
P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpreta-
tion in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993). Professor Frickey develops the
international themes in Federal Indian Law in Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 31 (1996).
4 Words like "dependent" and "trust" leap most quickly to mind.
5 Professor Frickey makes these points brilliantly in Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1754
(1997).
6 Philip Chase Bobbitt, Foreward to CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:
HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED ix (1997).
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ceded those aspects of sovereignty that were essential to a government worthy
of the name (the failure of the Articles of Confederation showed that the states
needed to yield more) and at the time of the Cherokee cases we were still more
than a generation away from the war that would remake our constitutional
structure and firmly fix in law, if not in politics, the nature of national
citizenship.7
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, the question was not difficult. Should a claimant
who derived his title from a purchase from the Piankeshaw tribe and claimed
priority of purchase prevail in an action in ejectment against another claimant
to the same parcel of land who derived his title from a federal patent? Although
the opinion was, perhaps, longer than was strictly necessary, Justice Marshall in
announcing the holding explained why:
After bestowing on this subject a degree of attention which was more required by the
magnitude of the interest in litigation, and the able and elaborate arguments of the
bar, than by its intrinsic difficulty, the Court is decidedly of opinion, that the plain-
tiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the United States;
and that there is no error in the judgment which was rendered against them in the
District Court of Illinois.
8
What explained the "magnitude of the interest?" Surely it was not interest
in the question of superiority of federal power to that of the Indians. What
Justice Marshall makes sure to assay is the genealogy of the federal power. He
viewed this first from the perspective of what the states ceded to the federal
government in the making of the union. But equally important he also asserted
a dignity of the federal government equal to the great powers of Europe who
still had, as Marshall termed it, "pretensions" in the Americas.
How the European powers came to have both title to the land and sover-
eignty over the inhabitants of the land they found was a question of law. It was
the settled law among nations that provided for accommodations in the Ameri-
cas between European powers. For Marshall, the question became one of con-
sistency with existing law.
[A]I1 the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this continent, have
asserted in themselves, and have recognized in others, the exclusive right of the dis-
coverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians. Have the American States
rejected or adopted this principle? 9
Marshall follows this inquiry with an examination of the status of the
States with regard to the powers claimed by Britain. The States out of which
the union was formed were the colonial expressions of the power of the crown,
thus the law announced by Britain that underlay the Proclamation of 1763 rep-
resented both the positive law and the theoretical structure for the sovereignty
of the states. Again, if you forgive another long quotation from the opinion,
7 It seems to me that Professor Black has this argument exactly right in his book, A NEW
BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED. BLACK, supra note 6. We also
appreciate that it is not an uncontroversial position. There is embedded in his argument the
claim that politics trumped law, as the basis of analysis, in the early cases on the civil war
amendments.
8 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 604-05 (1823).
9 Id. at 584.
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Marshall explained British constitutionalism to which the states were heirs as
follows:
According to the theory of the British constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the
crown, as representing the nation; and the exclusive power to grant them is admitted
to reside in the crown, as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has been already
shown, that this principle was as fully recognised in America as in the island of Great
Britain. All the lands we hold were originally granted by the crown;...
So far as respected the authority of the crown, no distinction was taken between
vacant lands and lands occupied by the Indians. The title, subject only to the right of
occupancy by the Indians, was admitted to be in the king, as was his right to grant
that title. The lands, then, to which this proclamation referred, were lands which the
king had a right to grant, or to reserve for the Indians.
According to the theory of the British constitution, the royal prerogative is very
extensive, so far as respects the political relations between Great Britain and foreign
nations. 1
0
According to Marshall, the crown exercised this power both to secure the
land and to exercise, to the extent possible, peaceable jurisdiction over the Indi-
ans.11 What the states ceded to the federal government, according to Marshall's
analysis was not just the territory beyond boundaries agreed upon as the territo-
rial reach of the states, but with it all of the sovereign power over those territo-
ries that came to the states from the crown. This power gave to the federal
government all of the powers regarding Indians that the crown held, but the
monopoly on this power fixed the relationship between the United States and
the European powers as one of juridical equality. All of these conclusions
would hold whether the land and the entire legislative jurisdiction of sover-
eignty that the territorial claims implied had come into the hands of the British
and from it to the states and from them to the federal government via discovery
or conquest. What should not be lost in this discussion, however, is that all of
the "law" that Marshall applied was derived, ultimately from the international
law that tied territory and sovereignty together. This includes the seeds of the
plenary power that was later to yield such bitter fruit.
Yet, if Johnson v. M'Intosh fixed the genealogy of the supremacy of
national power over the tribes, it did not fix the status of the tribes.1 2 Given the
next two cases in the trilogy, it is not clear that Johnson v. M'Intosh even
resolved the exclusive nature of the federal power. The lack of clarity about the
status of tribes as a matter of constitutional law was not resolved by locating
t Id. at 595-96.
1 Marshall concluded the quoted passage with the following assessment:
The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as a dependent,
and in some respects as a distinct people, occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet
too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required, that means should be
adopted for the preservation of peace; and that their friendship should be secured by quieting
their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the
whites; and the power to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the crown.
Id. at 596.
12 Of course, the Constitution gives to the Congress under the commerce clause and to the
President under the treaty power the primary authority for dealing with the tribes, but it does
not fix the constitutional position of the tribes and it does not suggest how expansive the
legislative power might be. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, §2, cl. 2.
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the legitimacy of the federal power in international law (and through that to the
constitutional tradition that gave the states their own legitimacy). Yet it was to
this source that Marshall again turned as the status of the tribes in relationship
to the states was made the central issue. The cession of the territory carried
with it the cession of legislative jurisdiction to the federal government. How-
ever, this authority was not without limits. In Johnson, Marshall adverted to the
law of nations that limited the prerogatives of the conqueror and gave to the
federal government the power to control the actions of those who would inter-
fere with the national government's exercise of that basic power.
In Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia,13 the Cherokee Nation sought an
injunction against the State of Georgia to restrain them from executing or other-
wise enforcing state laws within the Cherokee territory. The Cherokee
attempted to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus before
the Court could attend to the merits of the case it had to determine if the parties
were properly before it.14 Because the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court can be invoked in cases where a state is a party, the only question the
Court felt it had to answer was whether the Cherokee fell within the enumer-
ated parties to whom the Article III limitation applied. How should the Chero-
kee Nation be styled? Were they a foreign state? Were they a nation at all in
any constitutional sense?
In a relatively short opinion, Justice Marshall notes that, while
[t]he counsel have shown conclusively that they are not a state of the union, and have
insisted that individually they are aliens, not owing allegiance to the United States.
An aggregate of aliens composing a state must, they say, be a foreign state. Each
individual being foreign, the whole must be foreign.
This argument is imposing, but we must examine it more closely before we yield to
it. The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that
of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common
allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety,
applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.
1 5
The remainder of the opinion is aimed at marking out what those "peculiar
and cardinal distinctions" are. By holding that the Court does not have jurisdic-
tion, but that the tribe was not at the mercy of the State, Justice Marshall was
treading a very careful line. In attempting to describe the status of the tribe,
Justice Marshall retained the idea of their foreign-ness as an empirical matter
while rejecting it as a legal matter. Nonetheless, the tribes occupied a juridical
position somewhere between the states and foreign nations, but they were
clearly under the protection of the federal government. This obligation of pro-
tection was embedded in the international law that justified the assumption of
sovereignty over the tribes.
It is here that Justice Marshall proposed a formulation that was both rooted
in an established political thought as well as redolent of feudal relations. By
claiming a status that was sui generis Justice Marshall suggested a relationship
13 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
14 The State of Georgia was, in fact, not before the Court since they declined to make an
appearance.
'5 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
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between the federal government and the tribes that would temper the plenary
legislative jurisdiction that was suggested in Johnson. If they are not foreign in
the constitutional sense, how might their legal status be understood? In John-
son, Justice Marshall was clear about the continued political existence of the
tribes, that their political choices were circumscribed by the superior political
authority of the central government. But their status suggests limitations on that
superior political authority.
[Tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Mean-
while they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as
being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
16
Read in light of his analysis in Johnson, what is interesting is his reitera-
tion of the juridical genealogy of the status of tribes as well as a reformulation
of the idea of incorporation. Both seem to color his choice of metaphor. Read
as a colloquy with his fellow Justices, his formulation becomes richer. Unlike
Justice Johnson, who would have rejected the assertions of jurisdiction on the
grounds that the Cherokee were neither foreign nor a state, Justice Marshall
uses the designation "nation" to describe the tribe. To this Justice Johnson can
only heap scorn:
They have in Europe sovereign and demi-sovereign states and states of doubtful sov-
ereignty. But this state, if it be a state, is still a grade below them all: for not to be
able to alienate without permission of the remainder- man or lord, places them in a
state of feudal dependence.
17
Of course, Justice Marshall does invoke the feudal imagery. But his refer-
ent is, of course, a referent of restraint as well as of power. Though thought to
be among the most important of the feudal incidents, what it did was to bind
power to obligation even if the power ran in the direction of the guardian.
Similarly, Justice Baldwin expresses disbelief that there is any power in the
court to change the existing relations between the tribes and the states. By
16 Id. at 17, 18.
17 Id. at 17. (Johnson, J. concurring). Early in the opinion, Justice Johnson express his out-
raged incredulity:
Where is the rule to stop? Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or
nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state?
We should indeed force into the family of nations, a very numerous and very heterogeneous
progeny. The Catawbas, having indeed a few more acres than the republic of San Marino, but
consisting only of eighty or an hundred polls, would then be admitted to the same dignity. They
still claim independence, and actually execute their own penal laws, such as they are, even to the
punishment of death; and have recently done so. We have many ancient treaties with them; and
no nation has been more distinctly recognized, as far as such recognition can operate to comnu-
nicate the character of a state.
Id. at 25.
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parsing the treaty language he is clear that the rule of law that gave the crown
and through the crown, the colonies and then the union, sovereignty over the
territory cannot be divested because the President chose to use the language of
nationhood in the treaty.1 8 There are no magic to words if the facts do not
support them. Justice Baldwin thought that by taking jurisdiction over the case
the Court would be ascribing to the Cherokee a status they may have once had,
but no longer retained. Moreover, they would be arrogating to themselves a
political power not contemplated by the constitution and one that would, in all
events, be lawless.
In his dissent, Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story, looked at the
same facts and yet saw a completely different picture. Rather than beleaguered
savages, barely above the beasts of the forest that Baldwin and the others had
them hunting, they were a society that was ruled by their own codes and sover-
eign in their own territory. This was not a romantic vision, but rather one based
on both the facts of the encounter and the law that governed the evolving rela-
tions between whites and Indians.
The majority was wrong, according to Thompson, first, because the Court
had to recognize that the law of nations under which the United States itself
claimed sovereignty was itself the law that forced the Court to recognize the
sovereignty of the Cherokee. Second, the mere fact of military weakness is
insufficient to divest a state of it attributes of nationhood. He found apt the
analogy to tributary states of Europe. The tribes, like those small states, may
make alliances with stronger nations, but it is in the nature of the alliances that
the weaker states preserve as much of their sovereign independence as is possi-
ble. 9 According to Thompson, the nature of the dependence to which Justice
18 Id. at 34. (Baldwin, J., concurring):
I will next inquire how the Indians were considered; whether as independent nations or tribes,
with whom our intercourse must be regulated by the law of circumstances. In this examination it
will be found that different words have been applied to them in treaties and resolutions of con-
gress; nations, tribes, hordes, savages, chiefs, sachems and warriors of the Cherokees for
instance, or the Cherokee nation. I shall not stop to inquire into the effect which a name or title
can give to a resolve of congress, a treaty or convention with the Indians, but into the substance
of the thing done, and the subject matter acted on: believing it requires no reasoning to prove that
the omission of the words prince, state, sovereignty or nation, cannot divest a contracting party
of these national attributes, which are inherent in sovereign power pre and self existing, or confer
them by their use, where all the substantial requisites of sovereignty are wanting.
19 Id. at 52-53 (Thompson, J. dissenting):
The terms state and nation are used in the law of nations, as well as in common parlance, as
importing the same thing; and imply a body of men, united together, to procure their mutual
safety and advantage by means of their union. Such a society has its affairs and interests to
manage; it deliberates, and takes resolutions in common, and thus becomes a moral person,
having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and laws.
Vattel, 1. Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the
establishment of civil societies, live together in the state of nature, nations or sovereign states;
are to be considered as so many free persons, living together in a state of nature. Vattel 2, § 4.
Every nation that governs itself, under what form so ever, without any dependence on a foreign
power, is a sovereign state. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other state. Such are
moral persons who live together in a natural society, under the law of nations. It is sufficient if it
be really sovereign and independent: that is, it must govern itself by its own authority and laws.
We ought, therefore, to reckon in the number of sovereigns those states that have bound them-
selves to another more powerful, although by an unequal alliance. The conditions of these une-
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Marshall adverts is almost purely a political concept, although like all politics it
has it roots in the empirical reality of military inferiority. The relations between
the colonies and later with the U.S. were not lawless. Quite the contrary and the
fact of disparities in military strength does not change the obligation to estab-
lish relations subject to law. This is the point the majority concedes, despite the
attempts by Johnson and Baldwin to structure the argument otherwise. Justice
Thompson summarized this view as follows:
They have been admitted and treated as a people governed solely and exclusively by
their own laws, usages, and customs within their own territory, claiming and exercis-
ing exclusive dominion over the same; yielding up by treaty, from time to time,
portions of their land, but still claiming absolute sovereignty and self government
over what remained unsold. And this has been the light in which they have, until
recently, been considered from the earliest settlement of the country by the white
people. And indeed, I do not understand it is denied by a majority of the court, that
the Cherokee Indians form a sovereign state according to the doctrine of the law of
nations; but that, although a sovereign state, they are not considered a foreign state
within the meaning of the constitution.
20
The point is that while the power of the sword may set the ground for a
relationship to emerge and heavily structure its form, it is ultimately the back-
ground to legitimacy, not the expression of it. The next year, the Cherokee
would be back, not as parties, but as sovereigns.
In Worcester v. State of Georgia, the Court was confronted with an
attempt by the State of Georgia to regulate activity within the Cherokee terri-
tory, to prohibit the tribe from exercising its governmental authority and
expressly forbade anyone from entering into the Cherokee territory without a
license from the State of Georgia.2 Samuel Worcester, a Vermonter, was
arrested for preaching the gospel to the Indians within their lands without a
license. He was convicted and sentenced to four years at hard labor for his
crimes. The question for the Court was whether Worcester was subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of Georgia for actions undertaken in Cherokee country.
Or put more bluntly, did Georgia have any legitimate authority in Cherokee
territory?
Justice Marshall answered "No," in terms that more expressly meld the
arguments advanced in Thompson's dissent in Cherokee Nation with the con-
clusion reached in the opinion he wrote for the court.22 The Cherokee while not
qua] alliances may be infinitely varied; but whatever they are, provided the inferior ally reserves
to itself the sovereignty or the right to govern its own body, it ought to be considered an indepen-
dent state. Consequently, a weak state, that, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under
the protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of the right of government and
sovereignty, does not cease on this account to be placed among the sovereigns who acknowledge
no other power. Tributary and feudatory states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and indepen-
dent states, so long as self government, and sovereign and independent authority is left in the
administration of the state. Vattel, c. 1, pp. 16, 17.
20 Id. at 53-54 (Thompson, J. dissenting).
21 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
22 Id. at 560-61:
The actual state of things at the time, and all history since, explain these charters; and the king of
Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown. These newly
asserted titles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated in Indian treaties; extending to
them, first, the protection of Great Britain, and afterwards that of the United States. These arti-
[Vol. 5:93
"PERFECT GOOD FAITH"
completely independent, because of their political dependency on the United
States, were sovereigns in the nature of the tributary states of Europe, which
while needing the protection of a stronger state, did not cede any of their sover-
eignty except as they agreed to in the treaties of protection. The cession to the
stronger state created in the superior power the obligation to defend the powers
and independence of the weaker state against the predations of all others,
including the states from whom the federal government received its power.
This power was ceded to the central government from the states and the consti-
tution cleared up any confusion on that point that might have been left over
from the infelicitous language of the articles of confederation.23 In addition to
the power that the states had willingly ceded, the nature of the central govern-
ment implied a genealogy of unennumerated powers that were constitutive of
all national states. The states could no more reclaim the power to legislate in
Indian country than they could claim to enter into political arrangements with
the French. The tribes maintained complete legislative jurisdiction within their
territory subject only to the supervision and limitations negotiated between
them and the agents of the federal government. This was a power upon which
the states could not trench. It was a form of internal organization that was
independent of the federal government and the power it claimed, both by line-
age and by constitutional grant.
Central to all of these stories is the question of territory and law. The great
legal historian S.F.C. Milsom put the broad outlines this way: "Lordship was
property, the object of legal protection from above, just as it was jurisdiction,
the source of legal protection for rights below."2" This conception framed the
ideas of legitimacy, title, and legitimate jurisdiction in the international law
story that the Court told about the genesis of the current political status of
tribes. It is no accident that the opinions are redolent with feudal ideas. Land,
territory, jurisdiction, and power were all still being unwound. The idea of the
tribes standing in some kind of feudal hierarchy through which control of terri-
tory and thus jurisdiction (broadly speaking) were being worked out makes
sense. It also made sense for the national government to use that trope within
the context of an argument that made central government the legitimate succes-
sor to the powers of the crown. The individual states thus also stood in a modi-
fied feudal hierarchy, orthogonal to the tribes, but subordinate to the federal
cles are associated with others, recognizing their title to self government. The very fact of
repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self government, by associating
with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may
place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. 'Tribu-
tary and feudatory states,' says Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent
states, so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the admin-
istration of the state.' At the present day, more than one state may be considered as holding its
right of self government under the guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
23 Id. at 559. "That instrument [the Constitution] confers on congress the powers of war and
peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for
the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."
24 S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 99 (2d ed. 1981).
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government. The relationship depended not at all on the text giving the federal
government exclusive jurisdiction to treat with the tribes, but on the nature of
the state itself, on the genealogy of the idea of nationhood.
II. LAND IN THE WEST - THE DANN CASE
Lordship is distinct, historically, from proprietorship and because control
of land carried with it control over the occupants of the land, the evolution of
the relation between the lord and his subjects (even where they became citi-
zens) is, in some important measure, the evolution of claims over territory.2 5
The following sections detail two land disputes, both of which suggest limita-
tions of federal power over tribes and one of which raises, explicitly, the role of
international law as a boundary on the exercise of federal supervisory or trust
obligation. Because the authority exercised by the trustee traces its legitimacy
not to power, but to law, its foundations in the law of nations suggests that
there is some role to play for international norms. As suggested earlier, how-
ever, the role that international law ought to play is different in each case.
The saga of the Dann sisters and the Western Shoshone tribe that trail
through the federal courts to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
began in 1951.26 The Congress created the Indian Claims Commission to
resolve the myriad land and other claims outstanding between the tribes and the
federal government. The Western Shoshone had obtained a final settlement
from the Indian Claims Commission for $26 million. Yet the tribe did not
receive the money in satisfaction of the land claims because a distribution had
not been approved. Nonetheless, the tribe labored under the holding that the
deposit of the funds in a Treasury trust account for the tribe was sufficient to
discharge all claims and to preclude any member of the tribe from asserting an
ownership interest in the land.27
In 1974, the United States brought an action in trespass against Mary and
Carrie Dann. According to the United States, the Dann sisters were grazing
their cattle and horses on public land without a permit from the Bureau of Land
Management. The Dann sisters raised a claim of right through aboriginal title
as a defense to the trespassing claim. The Dann sisters made two claims: first
that the interest of the tribe in the land was not settled because payment had not
been made under the ICC settlement, and second, that they had an independent
claim to the land based on their individual aboriginal title. The second claim
was premised on the ways in which the tribe held land. The U.S. responded
that the: "(1) that the aboriginal title of the Western Shoshone had been extin-
25 Much of modem Indian law can be understood this way.
26 U.S. v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 42 (1985):
This case is an episode in a longstanding conflict between the United States and the Shoshone
Tribe over title to lands in the western United States. In 1951 certain members of the Shoshone
Tribe sought compensation for the loss of aboriginal title to lands located in California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. Eleven years later, the Indian Claims Commission
entered an interlocutory order holding that the aboriginal title of the Western Shoshone had been
extinguished in the latter part of the 19th century, Shoshone Tribe v. United States, I1 Ind. Cl.
Comm'n 387, 416 (1962), and later awarded the Western Shoshone in excess of $26 million in
compensation.
27 Id. at 50.
[Vol. 5:93
"PERFECT GOOD FAITH"
guished, and (2) that the extinguishment had been conclusively established in
proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission., 28 The district court agreed
with the government and the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court
reversed, but left the following question open:
The Danns also claim to possess individual as well as tribal aboriginal rights and that
because only the latter were before the Indian Claims Commission, the "final dis-
charge" of § 22(a) does not bar the Danns from raising individual aboriginal title as
a defense in this action. Though we have recognized that individual aboriginal rights
may exist in certain contexts, this contention has not been addressed by the lower
courts and, if open, should first be addressed below. We express no opinion as to its
merits.
2 9
On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim to aboriginal title and
claimed to find a contradiction between the two positions advanced by the
Dann sisters. Once the Supreme Court held that the trust account precluded the
claim by the Danns, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the since the sisters were
claiming through the tribe, once the tribe's interest was eliminated, the sisters'
claim went with it.
That should have been the end of it, but the sisters' claimed that the stat-
utes under which the case was decided violated their rights as created by the
Shoshone and further that the United States' application of the statutes to their
claim violated international norms to which the U.S. should be bound. The
sisters were taking a controversial position that the Ninth Circuit characterized
as anachronistic. The court's construction of the general notion of aboriginal
land rights put the sisters' claim on the tenuous basis of implied consent of the
government. Yet this construction misapprehends the claim the sisters were
making. Although it might be correct that the Taylor Grazing Act withdrew
"unappropriated lands" for settlement, the sisters were claiming that their title
pre-dated any withdrawal made by the U.S. Thus the claims that were settled
by the ICC did not include the claims asserted by the sisters since they were
distinct from those made by the tribe, although they were aboriginal Indian title
nonetheless.
It was in this posture that the Dann sisters took their appeal to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. They were, in essence, critical of the
tribal government that they felt settled a claim on their behalf that it had no
warrant to settle. They were primarily critical of the United States for setting in
train a process that commanded a specific way of dealing with Indian property
whether the tribe in question conformed to the model that animated the settle-
ment process. Once the Congressionally mandated procedure was underway,
none of the objects raised by the Dann sisters were cognizable, especially
because the Ninth Circuit, which had given some space for the sisters to make
their claim, closed off that avenue in its subsequent review.
Before the Commission, the Dann sisters claimed that the United States
interfered with the use and occupation of their ancestral lands by virtue of the
ICC proceedings and by removing and threatening to remove the sister's live-
stock from the lands covered by the settlement. Moreover, according to the
28 U.S. v. Dann 865 F.2d 1528, 1529 (1987).
29 Dann, 470 U.S. at 50.
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Danns, the U.S. had acquiesced in trespassing by gold prospectors within the
Western Shoshone traditional territory. All of these activities constitute a vio-
lation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the
"American Declaration."
Under the American Declaration, the Dann sisters made four specific
charges. First, that the actions of the United States government violated the
sisters' right to property. Second, the settlement procedures violated their right
to equal treatment under the law. Third, the failure to take into account the
landholding rules of the tribe by the U.S. violated their right to cultural integ-
rity. Finally, the violation of their right to cultural integrity also constituted a
breach of the Shoshone right to self-determination.
Article XXII of the American Declaration provides that:
Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of
decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.
30
The Dann sisters argued that the failure of the ICC to take into account the
full aboriginal claims of both the tribe and the individual members of the tribe
violated international property rights norms. The norms operate as a constraint
on the actions that Congress can take with regard to tribal property. It is not
answered by resort to the plenary power because the outside limits of the ple-
nary power were always circumscribed by the trust responsibility and the inter-
national norms relied on by the Dann sisters represent a substantive reading of
that obligation.
It was not just the American Declaration that commanded this result,
according to the Danns. Article 26 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples necessarily informs the reading of the Ameri-
can declaration as well as providing an independent basis for the Danns' claim.
Under that article, aboriginal peoples have the right to full recognition of their
laws, traditions and customs, land tenure systems and other institutions to
develop and manage their resources. Moreover, the state is under an obligation
to protect those rights.3 '
Yet, even if the Congress could determine the ultimate contours of the
property rights held by the Shoshone and the Danns, that power is not uncon-
strained in its execution. It is bounded by due process and equal protection
norms that form the background for the constitutional authority to act. The right
to property that the Danns claimed was violated, was jeopardized not just by
the substantive ruling, but by the procedural obstacles that the Danns claimed
made it impossible to assert their claim within the framework of the ICC settle-
ment process.
Of course, sorting out the procedural defects from the substantive defects
is especially difficult when the obligation is to harmonize radically different
legal systems, nonetheless, the Danns argued that the ICC permitted the non-
consensual transfer of Shoshone land to various non-indigenous trespassers.
While some of the transfers may have been consistent with U.S. law, even that
conclusion is not clear. What is clear is that the transfers were accomplished
30 Case 68, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 860, OEA/ser. LV/Il 17 doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002). [hereinafter
"Dann case."]
31 Id.
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without regard to the underlying land tenure system of the Western Shoshone.
Because the U.S. was under an obligation to protect and defend the Shoshone
interests, for the ICC to recognize these later claims is little more than abandon-
ment of a legal obligation incumbent upon the state. In addition, if the U.S. had
undertaken its duty to the tribes, it would have, at minimum, subjected the ICC
determination to the constitutional requirements that would have supported a
taking.
Even if the taking of the tribal property was deemed constitutionally per-
missible (taking into account the international norms against which those con-
stitutional obligations have to be read) the monetary award was calculated on
the basis of an arbitrary extinguishment date that, without interest from that
time did not provide the tribe with the same measure of just compensation that
would be imposed in the taking of non-indigenous property.
Because the Danns, among others, were not permitted to intervene in the
ICC proceedings, they claimed that the result was irremediably defective
because their interests were different from the tribe and thus could not have
been adequately represented by them. This denial of the right to participate in
addition to the other procedural defects rendered the ICC settlement fundamen-
tally in violation of the international norms of equality under the law.
Because the denial of their land claim would require the Danns to surren-
der their way of life, the ICC decision entailed more than the mere loss of
value. It required the Dann sisters to abandon their livelihood that was inti-
mately integrated to their lives as Shoshone. It is one thing for someone to lose
their livelihood because of a government decision that happens all of the time.
It is entirely another to try and transform one culture into another. That is the
lesson of the failure of the Dawes Act (putting, admittedly, the best possible
reading on the intentions of the allotment plans). The destruction of the capac-
ity to continue to live a culturally integrated life was an even greater affront
because, according to the Danns, it was done in a way that ignored the internal
political life of the Western Shoshone.
What the action before the IACHR aimed to do was to force the United
States to reckon with the international obligations that it has participated in
designing. The recent case involving the Awas Tingni community in Nicara-
gua, demonstrated that the Commission, among willing states, had the authority
to force a reconsideration of domestic definitions of indigenous property
rights.3" Here, the Danns successfully got the Commission to agree with their
claims and to demand that the United States respond in a substantive way. At
minimum, the United States ought to consider what their domestic law ought to
look like if it took into account the web of international obligations- within
which it participates. The increasingly inter-connected legal systems designed
to facilitate trade demonstrate that there is both the capacity and will to submit
local law to international norms. The question posed by the Danns is really the
question raised by the Marshall trilogy: Is the trust doctrine and the plenary
power a rule of law or the merest expression of power?
32 I/A Court H.R., Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judg-
ment of August 31, 2001 (Merits), at http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink../
• ./documents/eng/oasissues.asp.
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III. A BITTER PILL: ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF THE 1996
NAVAJO-HOPI SETTLEMENT ACT
The Hopi and Navajo tribes have fought over a 1.8 million acre piece of
land in Northern Arizona for over one hundred years. The dispute was already
termed "the greatest title problem of the West" in 1962, when the decision in its
first major litigation, Healing v. Jones, was handed down.33 Since that time it
has sparked massive legal battles, several efforts at Congressional intervention,
and the distribution of millions of federal dollars.
By the early 1990s, two different attempts at a solution had ended in fail-
ure. Healing created a joint tenancy on the disputed land. When that proved
unworkable, the federal government and courts tried to partition the area. This
plan relied upon forced relocations, which many of the Navajo families living
on the Hopi side of the partitioned land desperately resisted. The ensuing
standoff prompted government negotiators to attempt one last mediation.
The mediation has met with mixed success. Rather than impose another
ill-fitted mandate on the parties, this negotiation was structured to allow them
to fashion their own resolution of the conflict, with as little government
intercession as possible. However, many resistors were unhappy with the even-
tual agreement and several have refused to sign it. They argue that the terms of
the agreement violate fundamental rights protected under domestic and interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that if they brought their case before the
Commission it would find for them. Unlike the Dann case, this involves a fight
between tribes (or, more accurately, between one tribe and members of
another). Upholding indigenous rights for one side would undermine those of
the other, for this fight over control of a single, overstressed portion of land is
the classic zero-sum game.
A. The Background of the Dispute
Hopi religion relates that the tribe emerged onto the earth into the region
between the four corners of their world (Navaho Mountain, the Little Colorado
River, the San Francisco Mountains and the Luckachukas) at the beginning of
time.34 Most archeologists agree that the tribe and its ancestors have inhabited
this territory for up to 10,000 years.35 One of their towns, Oriabi, is deemed
the oldest continuously-occupied settlement in North America. 36 They have
developed a system of agriculture dependent on natural aquifers and rainfall
that has proved to be sustainable for centuries, despite the aridity of the land.3 7
The Hopi claim all of Northeastern Arizona- 18 million acres-as their tut-
11 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 (1962).
34 FRANK WATERS, BOOK OF THE Hopi 11-22 (1963).
35 Pat Sekaquaptewa, Evolving the Hopi Common Law, 9 KAN. J.L. & PIM, POL'Y 761, 762
(2000).
36 See Hopi, http://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/people/hopi.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
17 John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Law and Environment in Modem America and Among the Hopi
Indians: A Comparison of Values, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 417, 446-47 (1986).
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squa, or ancestral sacred homeland. 38 They retain a deep attachment to the
many sacred sites that now lie beyond the reservation's borders.39
Navajo beliefs also teach that the Navajo have always lived in the region
(alongside the Hopi), although the Hopi as well as archeologists dispute this.
Most scholars estimate that the Navajo entered the region sometime in the mid-
1500s to late 1600s 40 ; some place their arrival as late as the end of the 18th
century.4 They quickly adopted many Hopi customs and religious traditions,
although they preferred ranching to farming and maintained large flocks of
sheep.42 They also depended heavily upon raiding both neighboring Indians
and whites.43 In 1863, Kit Carson led an army expedition that removed 8,500
Navajo and interned them at Bosque Redondo, New Mexico." This is known
as "The Long Walk." The relocation and subsequent confinement exacted a
terrible toll; nearly a quarter of the population died.4 5 By 1868 the government
found the internment too expensive, and it granted the tribe a large reservation
east of Hopi lands.46 Their population grew rapidly, and they soon wandered
outside the unmarked boundaries of the reservation. Many settled near the
Hopi. 47 Navajo histories suggest that the tribes lived peacefully together.48
Contemporaneous U.S. government reports, however, assert that Navajo over-
whelmed the Hopi, raiding their possessions and claiming the best land.4 9 The
Hopi agree with this assessment, claiming that "[t]he Navajo appropriated for
their own use rangeland, farm fields and water resources, formerly used and
depended upon by the Hopi."5 The Hopi assert that it was in reaction to this
"harassment" that they withdrew from the lower lands and moved to the tops of
the mesas-a withdrawal that Navajo and whites both pointed to as indicative
of Hopi disinterest in and disuse of the land. The Hopi have characterized
Navajo expansion into their territory as "Navajo Manifest Destiny. 51
Concerns about Navajo and Mormon encroachment on Hopi land (as well
as a desire for the authority to throw off "white intermeddlers" who supported
Hopi traditionalist resistance to boarding schools) prompted the U.S. govern-
ment to create a Hopi reservation.52 On December 16, 1882, President Chester
38 See Tutsqua Ancestral Land, http://www.hopi.nsn.us/ancestral-land.asp (last visited Oct.
27, 2004) [hereinafter "Tutsqua Ancestral Land"].
39 Id.
40 Compare EMILY BENEDEK, THE WIND WON'T KNow ME: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO-
Hopi LAND DISPTE 58 (1992), with RicHARD 0. CLEMMER, ROADS IN THE SKY: THE Hopi
INDIANS IN A CENTURY OF CHANGE 33 (1995).
41 Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (1962).
42 BENEDEK, supra note 40, 63-64.
43 Id. at 65-66.
44 See L. KELLY, THE NAVAJO INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 5 (1968).
41 UNITED STATES COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AMERICAN COLONY
15 (Sept. 1975).
46 Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 135-36; WATERS, supra note 34, at 273-74, 281-82.
47 Id.
48 Eric Cheyfitz, Theory and Practice: The Case of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 10 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 619, 622 (2002).
4 See Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 136.
o See Tutsqua Ancestral Land, supra note 38.
51 The Taking of Hopi Land: A Hopi Perspective, Hopi Press Release, April 10, 1997.
52 Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 135-37.
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A. Arthur signed an Executive Order granting a 2.5 million acre area to the
Hopi as well as to "such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see
fit to settle thereon." Dispute about the meaning of this phrase, boilerplate
language in treaties of the time, animated the subsequent land conflict. Navajo
argued that it gave them the right to occupy the land, while the Hopi claimed it
referred to other tribes, like the Tewa, who have lived peacefully on the Hopi
reservation from its foundation.53
The U.S. did not initially view the "such other Indians" clause as estab-
lishing the right of Navajo to live on the Executive Order lands.5 4 Indeed, after
Hopi complaints of Navajos' "continual intrusions and depredations" that
destroyed Hopi crops and grazing lands, the Interior Department twice
requested that an expeditionary force be sent to expel the Navajo from Hopi
land. Both times the troops arrived in the middle of winter, and for humanita-
rian reasons decided to warn, not expel, the trespassers.55 Gradually, however,
acquiescence turned to acceptance, and by the 1920s the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs seemed to (erroneously) believe the Navajo had been settled on
the Hopi reservation, and thus had the right to remain. 56 In fact, government
officials even took steps to exclude Hopi settlement on land within their own
reservation, so that the Navajos' occupancy could continue undisturbed.5 7
Failed attempts to share and subdivide the land led to the 1962 landmark case
of Healing v. Jones. That litigation resulted in a decision granting the Hopi
exclusive control over land management district 6, which at 650,013 acres
encompassed most of the area of extensive Hopi use, and "joint, undivided and
equal interests" with the Navajo on the remaining 1.8 million acres of the Exec-
utive Order reservation.5 8
Unsurprisingly, this decision did not resolve the conflict, and seven years
later, the Hopi again brought suit to compel their admittance onto the Joint Use
Area (JUA).59 The district court that heard the case found that the Navajo had
continued to exercise almost complete control over the JUA. The exclusion of
the Hopi was encouraged by the Department of the Interior, which systemati-
cally denied to Hopi tribal members grazing permits on the Hopi Partitioned
Lands (HPL) that the Navajo routinely received.6" The court also found that
the Navajo had severely degraded the grazing land.61 It ordered the Navajo to
reduce their number of animals, reformulate their grazing policies, and take
53 Id. at 140.
54 Id. at 138-39.
55 Id. at 146-48.
56 Id. at 153.
17 Id. at 171-73.
58 Id. at 132.
51 See Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that the district court had
jurisdiction to enforce the 1962 judgment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
6 See Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming the district
court's findings and concluding that "the Navajo expectation of exclusive possession of the
area, and reliance thereon, has been fostered by a long history of governmental inaction and
tolerance of Navajo settlement in the area, and by official illegal restraint of Hopi
settlement.").
61 The government was complicit here too, for the permits that the Hopi were denied and
that were granted to the Navajo allowed far more intensive use than the land could support.
The result was near-total degradation. "The district court found that [Navajo tribal mem-
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measures to enhance Hopi participation in the use of the JUA.62 Two years
later, Congress partitioned the JUA via the Navajo and Hopi Indian Land Set-
tlement Act of 1974.63 The division was effectuated by a federal district court,
which apportioned 900,000 acres each to the Navajo and Hopi tribes, creating
the Hopi Partitioned Lands and the Navajo Partitioned Lands (NPL).6
Pursuant to the settlement, all of the few Hopi families residing in the
Navajo part of the JUA, as well as most of the many Navajo families on the
Hopi side of the line, were relocated.6 5 The relocation effort was undermined,
however, by the lack of nearby rural land suitable for accommodating the fami-
lies.6 6 This forced many traditionalist families into mostly white American cit-
ies, where they had few skills to survive.6 7 The problem was compounded by
corruption and opportunism among members of the Relocation Commission,
who directed the Navajo families to contractors who produced substandard
housing.6 8 The families that resisted relocation were forced to live in ever-
declining conditions, as a strictly-enforced building freeze prevented new con-
struction. By the mid-1990s, some elderly women were living in caves
scratched out of hillsides.69
In 1988, a group of Navajo still living on the HPL brought another law-
suit, this time for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. They claimed that
the Settlement Act violated rights generated by statutory, constitutional, and
bers] have so extensively overgrazed the range that 80% of the joint use area is producing
only 0% - 25% of its maximum forage, and that the range is still deteriorating." Id. at 1147.
62 Specifically, the court ordered:
Navajo stock reduction; a program to restore the badly overgrazed range; a restriction of Navajo
construction; a division of all income from rental or exploitation of the joint use area, including
mineral resources; issuance of an equal number of grazing permits to members of each tribe; the
issuance of a writ of assistance; and development of more specific plans to implement the broad
outlines of the Order of Compliance.
Id. at 1142 n. 2.
63 Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640(d) et
seq.).
6 See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming the partition).
65 Congress found that:
As of July of 1996, 4,432 Navajo and Hopi families have applied for relocation benefits. Of
those, 3,373 have been certified eligible and 2,730 have received relocation benefits. Approxi-
mately 643 eligible families continue to wait for relocation benefits. Many of those Navajo fami-
lies waiting for benefits have long ago complied with the law and voluntarily left the homes they
had on lands partitioned to the Hopi Tribe .... [T]here are [also] estimated to be between 50
and 100 Navajo families residing on lands partitioned to the Hopi Tribe who have never applied
for relocation benefits under the law.
S. REP. No. 104-363, at 5 (1996).
66 "The Navajo Reservation is a paradox. It is an area of low population density which is
severly overcrowded and has been for decades. The kind of free land that has been talked
about simply does not exist." BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 71 (quoting Anthropologist David
Aberle, testifying before the House Indian Subcommittee). Those already living on the Nav-
ajo Reservation itself were consequently leery of welcoming the families (and their flocks)
who were relocated from the HPL. Telephone interview with Peter Steenland, former lead
negotiator of the 1996 Settlement (Mar. 26, 2003) (on file with author).
67 See BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 200-37.
68 Id. Some of these claims eventually made it to the courts, with limited success. See, e.g.,
Begay v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 107 (1987).
69 Telephone interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66.
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international law, and sought a declaration of "the right for themselves and
their heirs in perpetuity, to reside on the Hopi Reservation on what they con-
sider their extensive customary use areas, with unlimited grazing privileges, the
right to construct such buildings as they wish, and to utilize unlimited water
claimed necessary to their needs."7° The district court dismissed the case, find-
ing that the Navajos' rights had not been violated, and that therefore they had
not demonstrated either a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance
of hardships tipped in their favor. On appeal the Ninth Circuit, instead of
deciding the case, ordered the tribes and the United States to enter into media-
tion. Out of this mediation emerged the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of
1996.
The decision to turn to the parties for solutions was unique in the history
of the dispute. Previous proposals seemed to come from everyone - district
and appellate judges, congressmen, Indian agents, Secretaries of the Interior,
Superintendents, Acting Solicitors, Indian Inspectors, Commissioners of Indian
Affairs, and others - but the parties themselves.7" Neither the tribes nor the
affected individuals remained passive during the 100-year conflict, but their
advocacy passed through a filter of government officials' opinions and agen-
das. This reluctance to turn to the parties probably arose for a variety of rea-
sons: paternalism and racism; a sense that the polarization of the conflict would
render futile any attempt at mediation; officials' value judgments, and conse-
quent beliefs about which side should prevail; and a sense that the solution
should be rooted in legal doctrine and political exigencies, both of which could
be best directed by the U.S. government.
B. The Positions of the Parties
The parties themselves offer widely different accounts of the conflict's
causes and potential solutions. The Hopi blame Navajo encroachment and U.S.
acquiescence. The Navajo accuse the U.S. of inventing the conflict. The fed-
eral negotiators for the 1996 Settlement adopted a Solomonic approach, aban-
doning assignments of responsibility and attempting to give each party at least
a portion of what was most important to it - and thereby encouraging conces-
sions from both parties, each of whom felt wronged.
The Hopi claim a right to complete control over the HPL on the basis of
both historical possession and spiritual responsibility. The Hopi have not tradi-
tionally thought of their presence on their land as representing ownership so
much as caretaking.72 They relate that they are
bound to the tutsqua not only by a long history, but also by their belief that they
entered into a sacred pact with Massau, guardian of this world. As long as the Hopi
follow Massau's teachings and care for the land they are allowed to remain in their
tutsqua. Hence land is intricately interwoven with Hopi religion, culture and daily
life. To the Hopi, taking away the land for which they serve as stewards is tanta-
mount to the destruction of the Hopi themselves.
73
70 Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515, 1516 (D. Ariz. 1989). For a detailed
description of these claims, see Part LII.B, infra.
71 See historical survey in Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134-179 (1962).
72 Ragsdale, supra note 37, at 465 n.120.
73 Tutsqua Ancestral Land, supra note 38.
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Their emphasis on careful maintenance and balance has allowed them sus-
tainably to practice agriculture in a desert environment for centuries. 4 Indeed,
Hopi myths teach that they chose this land precisely because of its harshness,
so that they would not become self-concerned, acquisitive, and aggressive, as
had happened on other worlds.75
Hopi culture is marked by egalitarianism on the one hand, and a tightly
integrated normative community life on the other. Although each village has
religious and political leaders, they do not try directly to regulate individual
behavior.7 6 Rather, compliance with the Hopi way is achieved through lateral
pressure - the desire of individuals to maintain the good opinion of their neigh-
bors, and the gossip and changed attitudes of the community when that good
opinion is lost.77 Identity between community and individual values is fur-
thered by the abhorrence of competition and individual gain.7 8 Material wealth
should not be hoarded but shared throughout the community.7 9
Many Hopi view Navajo culture as diametrically opposed to those values.
To the Hopi, the Navajo are materialistic, 80 aggressive and untrustworthy, will-
ing to raid the property of their neighbors and friends when it suits them. 8'
Moreover, they see them as latecomers and poor land managers, who can claim
no rightful possession of the land either by virtue of history82 or responsible
husbandry. 83 They also see the Navajo as succeeding politically - to the
74 Ragsdale, supra note 37, at 446-47. The Hopi engage in dry-land farming in a region that
receives an average annual rainfall of eight to ten inches. See The Importance of Farming to
the Tribe, http://www.hopi.nsn.us/farning.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter
"Importance of Farming to the Tribe"].
71 WATERS, supra note 34, at 36, 11-22.
76 Ragsdale, supra note 37, at 443-44.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 444-45.
79 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 47.
80 Hopi point to the mention of wealth in many Navajo names: Manybeads, Manygoats, etc.
Telephone interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66. The Navajos' greater tolerance of
individual wealth, as it is closer to Anglo-American custom, may partly account for their
white allies' strong support. See, for example, Benedek's account of Indian agents' prefer-
ence for Navajo "industriousness" compared to the "Hopis' lackadaisical attitude toward
animal husbandry and establishing a presence on the land," BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 35,
as well as her own suspicion of Hopi egalitarianism. Id. at 43-44.
81 BENEDEK, supra note 40, 105-07.
82 The Hopi, who repeatedly refer to the Navajo families' interest in the JUA as "squatters'
rights," see them as encroachers. They describe the transfer of Hopi land to these individu-
als as "a devastating loss." See generally the articles posted by the Hopi tribe, http:llwww.
hopi.nsn.us/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). They attribute the creation of the JUA to an igno-
rant belief by the Healing court that the two tribes had the same culture and could live
peacefully together. They retort, "Nothing was further from cultural reality. For the Navajo,
'Joint Use' meant 'No Hopi Use' and they continued to claim all of the land for themselves."
Tutsqua Ancestral Lands (Continued), http://hopi.nsn.us/ancestraljland2.asp (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter "Tutsqua Ancestral Land(Continued)"].
83 The charge that the HPL Navajo are poor stewards of the land is supported by a variety of
observations from various sources. The Hamilton court found the land severely overgrazed
following Navajo occupation. See Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir.
1974). Peter Steenland, arriving nearly 20 years later and after massive cuts in Navajo stock
had been enforced, found the land still stressed by overuse. Telephone interview with Peter
Steenland, supra note 66.
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Hopis' detriment - through astute lobbying. Peter Steenland, one of the gov-
ernment's lead negotiators on the 1996 settlement, remarked:
The Hopi had lost almost a third of their land in an earlier judicial partition. Unlike
the Navajo, they had no interest in sitting down to resolve this matter, because the
Hopi believed they would be out-muscled by the better connected Navajo Nation
.... [Tihey felt the Navajo had denigrated Hopi sovereignty, overgrazed their lands
with Navajo sheep, disrespected their culture and concern for the land, and acted as if
[the families that had resisted relocation] were the victims instead of the Hopi.
8 4
For the Hopi, therefore, the problem arose with the Navajo, and was per-
petuated by U.S. complacency and inaction." Only regaining complete control
of their land would satisfactorily solve the conflict.
The Navajo tell a different story. Their creation myths, related in the Dine
bahane', describe the Navajo as emerging onto this land from the earth at the
same time as the Hopi.86 They maintain that, while tensions have arisen at
times, their coexistence with the Hopi has generally been peaceful.87 It was the
involvement of the United States that created the conflict, through engendering
competition for land and encouraging the exploitation of natural resources in
ways that would benefit white speculators. The Navajo claim that the Hopi
reservation was created not to protect the Hopi from Navajo encroachment, but
to eliminate the resistance of Hopi traditionalists and their few white allies to
American cultural imperialism. 89 Subsequent conflicts, including the Healing
litigation, were inspired by self-interested lawyers with connections to busi-
nesses eager to extract the reservation's resource wealth for below-market com-
pensation. 90 For the Navajo, the problem could be resolved if the United
States, along with self-interested white individuals and corporations, withdrew
from the area, and allowed the Navajo families to remain.
Traditional Navajo live in relative isolation, in family groupings. Histori-
cally transhumant, most now are sedentary, due to increased population density
on the reservation. 9 ' Navajo culture is matrilineal and matrilocal. 92 Tradition-
alist mothers expect to pass on their areas of customary land use to their daugh-
ters. This tradition creates an important sense of continuity through the
generations. 93 Daughters' settlement near their mothers also allows for the care
84 Telephone Interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66. See also Tutsqua Ancestral
Land(Continued), supra note 82.
85 See Tutsqua Ancestral Land(Continued), supra note 82. In fact, the U.S. was at times
quite active in the exclusion of Hopi from the JUA and the degradation of the land. See
supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
86 Cheyfitz, supra note 48, at 621.
87 Id. at 622.
88 Id. at 622-23.
89 Id. at 623.
90 Id. at 625-28. This the Hopi vehemently deny, at least as regards the litigation in the
latter part of the 20th century. They characterize the conflict as purely an intertribal dispute
over land. They do level a claim of white interference at the resistors, asserting that the
dispute has been encouraged and exacerbated (and made violent) by "outside agitators." See
generally Hopi press releases, http://www.hopi.nsn.us/Pages/Trutsqua/releases.htmi. (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2004).
91 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 64.
92 Id. at 84-84.
93 Id.
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of elderly Navajo with a minimum of dislocation.94 The Navajo families'
attachment to their land is rooted in both practical and religious considerations.
Families who have lived there for generations possess an intimate and crucial
knowledge of the locations of water and edible plants, which will be lost with
any relocation. 95 Moreover, gods, to the Navajo, are local. Shrines must be
placed, and petitions made, only at certain locations. Traditional Navajo worry
that if they move they will lose that entire religious infrastructure.96 Navajo
also feel a deep emotional connection to their sheep, which are considered to
represent a whole way of life, and are honored as individuals.97 The relocation
effort, which forced huge stock reductions and sought to move traditionalist
families from their customary use lands, thus is seen by them as an absolute
assault on their culture and way of life.
Any attempt to arrive at a solution that would be acceptable to both tribes
must at least address those perceptions. Enlisting the support of both parties
was, and is, critical. The United States spent over a third of a billion dollars on
relocation efforts alone from the 1960s to 1999.98 Diverting still more
resources to a buy-out or another elaborate compensation scheme may not be
possible. Nor may strict enforcement. Both the Hopi tribe and the federal gov-
ernment have been and remain unwilling to confront the political outrage that
would be inspired by directing federal marshals to evict old women from their
homes. Without the prospect of ultimate force to carry out a decree, the gov-
ernment has been forced to rely at least to some degree on voluntary participa-
tion by the parties.
1. The 1996 Settlement
a. The settlement process
The 1996 settlement negotiations were marked by a degree of tribal
involvement not previously seen in the scope of this conflict. From the first,
the negotiators saw their role as that of facilitators only. Steenland observed:
As trustee for both tribes, and defendant in numerous suits filed by each of them
against us, we had a common obligation. Early on . .. I established three rules for
the federal parties in the mediation. One: we would not force any resolution on any
party. A settlement had to be totally voluntary. Two: we would not use money to
"buy out" any party, because BIA had a very limited budget and it would have
adversely affected tribes in other parts of the country if we took money intended for
them to distribute in northern Arizona. Three: we would favor neither side, but work
with the mediator to develop settlement options for consideration by all. 99
14 Telephone interview with Britt Clapham, former counsel for the Navajo Nation (Apr. 22,
2003) (on file with author).
95 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 103.
96 See The Right to Development, Written Statement Submitted to the UN Commission on
Human Rights by the International Indian Treaty Council for the Commission 's 59th Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/NGO/124 (Mar. 12, 2003); Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, written statement submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights by the Interna-
tional Indian Treaty Council for the Commission's 58th Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/
NGO/48 (Jan. 24, 2002).
9 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 83-84.
98 Telephone interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66.
99 Id.
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Interior Department officials met extensively with members of the Hopi
and Navajo tribal governments. Just as important, negotiators dealt directly
with members of the Navajo families affected, for they recognized that the
families' position was not identical to that of the Navajo Nation. (The families
also employed their own lawyers throughout the process.) Katherine Hazard,
the lead negotiator after Steenland left, lived on the reservation for nine
months, trying to establish among the Navajo families the degree of trust neces-
sary to participate."° The Hopi were, if anything, more reluctant. They saw
official attempts to resolve the conflict as threatening Hopi control over their
lands. Therefore, while they might be forced by the court to enter the media-
tion, they would not necessarily participate in working toward a solution. To
gain their trust, the negotiators tried to find ways to demonstrate that they might
come away with positive changes. Early on, they discovered that the Hopi
were encountering some harassment as they moved through the reservation to
collect eaglets for their religious ceremonies. The negotiators were able to pro-
cure a pledge from Navajo President Peterson Zah that such harassment would
cease. That allowed the delegates to report to the tribe that they had achieved
some success from the process. After three meetings, the Hopi produced a list
of ten additional preconditions for the Navajo to meet in order to demonstrate
their willingness to enter the negotiations in good faith. These included such
points of contention as grazing, fencing, and vandalization. These were issues
that the Hopi "considered to be infringements upon their life, sovereignty, and
ability to manage their land in a sustained, responsible manner."
101
After five years of negotiations and two scuttled proposals, the parties
finally reached a compromise. The terms of the Settlement Act provide that the
Navajo families may lease from the Hopi Tribe, free of cost, a three-acre home
site and ten acres of farmland - the same size of parcel available to Hopis.
10 2
The lease term is seventy-five years and was understood to be renewable. 103
The injunction against new home building was lifted, and grazing privileges
100 Id.
101 Id. Steenland remarked:
Some of the items ... had major political significance for the Hopi people, and accomplishment
of the preconditions was seen by us as helping to create a climate where the people affected by
the talks could begin to think about settlement. For example, the statute partitioning the land
gave the Hopi the right to fence their reservation. Since it is located entirely inside the Navajo
reservation [the Hopi refer to their reservation, bounded on all sides by the much larger Navajo
reservation, as "landlocked"], it was a matter of tribal sovereignty to be able to construct such
fences, especially to keep out Navajo sheep and horses. However, every time the Hopi tried to
construct another mile of fence, the Navajo would invoke some historic preservation claim,
asserting the fence was passing over religiously significant land, and get a temporary restraining
order from a federal judge in Phoenix. Our ability to get the fence finished demonstrated to the
Navajo that the Hopis would not be pushovers, to the Hopi that the Navajo could be dealt with
successfully by them, and showed the families that they needed to get serious about this process.
Id.
102 See S. REP. No. 104-363, at 47-54 (1996).
103 Telephone interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66. Renewal was not written into
the lease, in case the Hopi continue to find Navajo use unacceptable. The Hopi have
reminded the Navajo families, however, that other Indians, most notably members of the
Tewa tribe, have lived without conflict on the Hopi reservation.
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were expanded." The government agreed to construct new housing for fami-
lies that chose to relocate. Families were given until March 31, 1997 to sign
the Accommodation Agreement or agree to move off the HPL. Those that
refused would face eviction by the year 2000.o5
The two major restrictions placed on HPL Navajos are the inability to vote
in Hopi government, despite the fact that they are subject to Hopi regulation,
and the prohibition against creating new sacred sites, such as burials. The Hopi
tribe insisted on the latter provision, asserting, "From bitter experience the
Hopi have learned that the Navajo use so-called sacred sites to prevent Hopi
from using areas of their own land, and use them in legal disputes to claim
Hopi land."' 1 6 They characterize the voting restrictions as normal incidents of
different citizenship, no different from the status of immigrants under U.S.
law. 107
Upon the implementation of the Agreement, the Hopi were to receive
financial compensation from the United States.'0" The Act also sets out new
104 Navajo families that sign the AA are entitled to graze as many animals as Hopi families.
Permitting is determined every four years, after a determination of sustainability based on
the level of forage, water and wildlife. Any individual (Hopi or Navajo) that exceeds the
limits faces the impoundment of livestock. See Letter to the United Nations, High Commis-
sion for Human Rights, May 9, 2001, by Cedric Kuwaninvaya, Chairman of the Land Team
(on file with author) [hereinafter "Kuwaninvaya letter"]. Although the tribe recognizes that
"in some circumstances permitted animal units may be below subsistence levels," it asserts
that such management is necessary to restore the range, and is therefore the only way to
maintain economic stability for all HPL residents. See Livestock Permitting is Good Land
Stewardship, Hopi Press Release, June 12, 2001.
105 S. REP. No. 104-363, at 8 (1996). Though eviction notices were served within a year of
the finalization of the AA, none have been carried out, due to a reluctance by Hopi and
federal officials to appear as "the bad guy." Telephone interview with Wilbert Goy, Navajo/
Hopi Land Commission, Apr. 6, 2004 (on file with author).
106 Kuwaninvaya letter, supra note 104.
107 See Taking of Hopi Land: A Hopi Perspective, supra note 51.
108 This was to take place through a tiered structure of contingent payments:
Phase 1: payment of $2.4 million in settlement of Hopi claims against the United States
in Secakuku v. Hale, 108 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997).
Phase 2: payment of $22.7 million in settlement of Court of Federal Claims cases for
damages caused by federal actions prior to 1982, following Congressional authorization for
the tribe to offer 75-year leases (preexisting law limited the tribe to offering 25-year lease
terms with one 25-year renewal).
Phase 3: payment of $10 million in settlement of Court of Federal Claims cases for
livestock trespass damages against the U.S. from 1983 to 1988, if or when sixty-five percent
of the Navajo heads of household eligible to sign the AA either do so or relocate.
Phase 4: payment of $15.1 million in settlement of the third and final portion of the
Court of Federal Claims Cases, if or when seventy-five percent of the eligible Navajo heads
of household have signed the AA or relocated.
Additionally, since "The continued occupation of the Hopi Partitioned Lands by the
Navajo families deprives the Hopi Tribe of certain uses of its lands," and "the acreage made
effectively unavailable for Hopi use is greater than a simple calculation of the homesite and
farmsite acreage would suggest," additional lands, purchased with Hopi funds, will be taken
into trust for the tribe. Furthermore, if by Phase 4 seventy-five percent of Navajo heads of
household have signed on to the AA or left the HPL, up to 500,000 acres of rural fee lands or
combined fee and State lands, purchased (without condemnation procedures) by the tribe
would also be taken into trust. The federal government will also condemn certain state
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water use arrangements109 and the establishment of Hopi jurisdiction over the
HPL. This last point was crucial to the Hopi, for they felt that it was upon it
that all the rest of their rights (to limit grazing, occupancy, and term) depended.
The Navajo Nation ultimately withdrew from the process. It may have
received mixed signals from its diverse constituency, and it was under signifi-
cant pressure from the resistors. 110 The Council encouraged the families to
make their own individual decisions about whether to sign, but it concluded
that the hardship of the terms fell disproportionately on the Navajo, and passed
a resolution registering its disapproval.
b. Results
The Settlement Act has in large part been successful. The majority of the
Navajo families have entered into leases under the Accommodation Agreement
or have accepted newly-built houses off-reservation, and the Hopi are thus
qualified to receive the full compensation awarded them by the terms of the
Act." 1
Many of those who have signed the Accommodation Agreement have
pointed to significant practical problems with its implementation, however.
Representatives of the Navajo claim that the Accommodation Agreement has
not been fully implemented.' 12 For example, while families were told they
could adjust the size of their home site leases, the mechanism for doing that
was never clearly laid out. Service distribution has also been problematic. The
Navajo Nation distributes services through local chapterhouses. Most Navajo
services do not reach to the HPL. The Hopi have stepped in to provide many
services the Navajo cannot - in fact, they may be providing more than the
Navajo Nation.' 13 Still, since the Hopi reservation, unlike the Navajo Nation,
is not organized into chapters, many of the families do not know where they
can access the services provided by the tribe.1 '4 More information to facilitate
that process has not been forthcoming." 5 Even the services that the Navajo
families know how to access from the tribe may not be claimed, as many
lands, with the state's permission and using Hopi funds, in order to minimize checker-
boarding.
This agreement was ratified by Congress, after raising the percentage of compliant Nav-
ajo heads of households required under Phase 4 to 85 percent. See Navajo-Hopi Land Dis-
pute Settlement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-301, 110 Stat. 3651 (1996); see also Clinton v.
Babbit, 190 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1999).
109 To accommodate the slurry line from Peabody Coal, itself a major source of conflict.
See The Water Crisis, http://www.hopi.nsn.us/water.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [herein-
after "Water Crisis"].
1lO Interviews with Steenland and Goy, supra notes 66 and 105.
"l See Manybeads Case Dismissed, Hopi Press Release, Apr. 18, 2000.
112 Telephone interview with Britt Clapham, former counsel for the Navajo Nation (Apr. 22,
2003) (on file with author).
113 Much of this is financed by federal money, which carries with it prohibitions on restrict-
ing who may receive the services based on ethnicity (or other characteristics of a protected
class). Goy, supra note 105.
114 Telephone interview with Britt Clapham, supra note 112.
115 Id.
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remain wary of the Hopi, due to what they feel was a "scorched earth" policy of
enforcing the building freeze in the 1970s.'16
An organization representing Navajo families from every region of the
HPL has grown up. The group is working with lawyers (financed by the Nav-
ajo Nation) to incorporate into 501(c)(3) status, so that it may provide services
such as water, electricity, housing, and meeting facilities, without the assistance
of either tribe. Individuals have even looked into incorporating as a chapter
and sending representatives either to the Hopi or Navajo tribal councils, though
legal hurdles have blocked the proposal.117
The compliance of signing families with the terms of the Accommodation
Agreement is less than ideal. Grazing remains an important point of conten-
tion, as do other regulated activities such as solid waste disposal and woodcut-
ting. In many cases, educating the families about Hopi ordinances has solved
the bulk of the problems. Nevertheless, many families have criticized the relo-
cation policy for not providing a way for family members to obtain adjacent
home sites, which is problematic because it erodes the traditional Navajo settle-
ment patterns.' 18 It also provides relocation benefits only to those whose heads
of households applied for those benefits previously. That does not accommo-
date the situation of those individuals whose parents did not sign, but who now
would like to take advantage of the program. 119 The progress of implementa-
tion has progressed quite slowly, at least in part because of the Navajo Nation's
disapproval of the Settlement terms. 20
There is also a small group of traditional Navajo families that have refused
either to sign or relocate. They reside in every section of the HPL, but one
group, centered around the Big Mountain area, was particularly vocal through
the 1980s and 1990s and became a representative for Navajo resistors.1 21 In
1979, these individuals broke away from the Navajo Nation, forming an organi-
zation they call the Sovereign Dineh Nation (SDN). They claimed that they
were being ousted to make way for coal exploitation in the HPL, and character-
ized the grazing policy and other enforcement of the Settlement Acts as terrori-
zation designed to undermine their resistance. 122 They viewed relocation as
116 Id.
117 Goy, supra note 105.
11 Telephone interview with Britt Clapham, supra note 112.
119 Id.
120 Telephone interview with Kevin Gover, former counsel for the Navajo Nation, Mar. 9,
2004 (on file with author).
121 For the past two or three years, it has turned its attention to other issues and has become
less involved with the land dispute. Goy, supra note 105.
122 One article went so far as to compare the grazing policy to eradication campaigns by the
United States in its aggression against Western Indian tribes in the 1800s. See Terror in
Arizona: Bureau of Indian Affairs Seizes Elderly Indians' Livestock in Push to Final Solu-
tion on Black Mesa, Reports Sovereign Dineh Nation, PRNEWSwIRE, Mar. 11, 1999 ("A
campaign of livestock confiscation intended to starve and frighten the residents of Black
Mesa into abandoning their homes was resumed recently by the U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), reports Sovereign Dineh Nation. These actions follow the government's his-
toric pattern of destroying food sources and using fear to force Indians off their lands.").
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utterly devastating, and likened it to a second Long Walk.123 These individuals
waged an extensive international media campaign and brought a number of
lawsuits, all directed at maintaining their presence on the HPL without
acknowledging Hopi jurisdiction.
The number of individuals involved is not large. Only 7 families as a
whole have refused to sign the Accommodation Agreement or leave; the total
number of individuals is less than 30.124 But the resistance has had a signifi-
cant effect. The Hopi complain about an influx of political activists and politi-
cal rallies, and have brought several ejectment actions and charges of criminal
trespass. 125 Activists have engaged in civil disobedience, such as cutting the
fence between the Hopi and Navajo reservations, building unauthorized struc-
tures, and holding politicized religious ceremonies on the HPL without Hopi
approval. 12 6 Threats of violence have arisen. 127 Furthermore, the Hopi fear
that under the pressure of this conflict, the alliances between the two tribal
governments may unravel. 128 The strain has been evident. Representatives
from the two tribal governments used to meet monthly to discuss common
issues, but the Navajo Nation ended the meetings in 2001, after the Hopi tribe
shut down a Sundance organized by the Big Mountain group without a per-
mit. 129 The Hopi tribe saw the ceremony as essentially a political rally for the
resistors. "o
The resistors have repeatedly petitioned the United Nations (UN) to inter-
vene in the dispute. Both sides have appeared before UN bodies to plead their
side of the issue. The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, an advisory body to the UN Commission on
Human Rights, responded by authorizing two members of the Sub-Commis-
sion's Working Group on Indigenous Populations to visit the United States and
prepare a report on relocation efforts under the 1974 Settlement. 131 Personnel
changes delayed the trip until the following year. The delegates prepared two
123 See Statement by Roberta Blackgoat, Dineh Elder, Big Mountain Arizona, http://www.
nativeartists.org/BigMountain/RobertaBlackgoat.html (Apr. 14, 1999) (last visited Oct. 27,
2004).
124 Goy, supra note 105. The number of individuals includes members of other families as
well. Every individual over the age of 18 must sign the AA to remain legally on the HPL.
In some cases, family members have made different decisions about signing.
125 See Hopi Press Releases: Hopi Jury Finds Crittenden Guilty of Criminal Trespass, Mar.
27, 2002; Hopi Tribe Disappointed with Dismissal of Trespass Charges, Mar. 4, 2002;
Exclusion Order Upheld, Nov. 14, 2001; Hopi Tribe Asserts Its Jurisdiction over the HPL:
Camp Anna Mae Dismantled, Aug. 17, 2001; Kee Shay Hearing Plagued by Delays, June
27, 2000; Hearing Finds Arlene Hamilton Violated Hopi Laws, Apr. 26, 2000.
126 See Hopi Press Releases: HPL Navajo Families Support Hopi Exclusion, Mar. 29, 2000;
Exclusion Hearing Concluded: Tribal Sovereignty at Heart of Case, Mar. 21, 2000; Hopi
Tribe Asserts Its Jurisdiction over the HPL: Camp Anna Mae Dismantled, Aug. 17, 2001.
127 See Hopi Press Releases: Bomb Scare at Hopi, Oct. 2, 2001; Shooting at Village of
Oraibi, Oct. 3, 2000; Sacred Ceremony is Used for Political Motives, July 12, 2001.
128 See Hopi Press Releases: President Kelsey Begay Pledges to Trample the Rights of
Hopi People, Sept. 18, 2001; Hopi Sovereignty is the Crux of the Issue, July 20, 2001.
129 Goy, supra note 105.
130 Hopi Tribe Asserts Its Jurisdiction over the HPL: Camp Anna Mae Dismantled, supra
note 125.
131 See Hearing Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the United States Senate
on the Views and Concerns of the People of Northern Arizona Regarding the Navajo-Hopi
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reports and a draft for a Sub-Commission resolution, which warned "that
human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected by institutions of
local, internal or autonomous self-government, no less than by States;" the Sub-
Commission eventually issued a number of resolutions encouraging the partici-
pation of the affected families in the settlement process.132 The UN Special
Rapporteur, on a 1998 visit the United States to assess its protection of relig-
ious rights generally, also drew special attention to the Hopi-Navajo conflict.' 3 3
c. Challenges
When they brought suit in 1988, the Manybeads plaintiffs claimed that the
relocation effort and the restrictions placed on HPL Navajos in the 1970s vio-
lated fundamental rights. They asserted that they possessed "the right for them-
selves and their heirs in perpetuity, to reside on the Hopi Reservation on what
they consider their extensive customary use areas, with unlimited grazing privi-
leges, the right to construct such buildings as they wish, and to utilize unlimited
water claimed necessary to their needs."' 34 Their seven claims complained of:
violation of religious rights protected under the free exercise clause of the
United States constitution, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the
equal protection clause, customary international law and the United Nations
Charter; violation by the United States of its federal trust responsibility; depri-
vation of the families' rights under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter as
a Non-Self-Governing People; and genocide.' 35
The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory injunction
establishing these claims and injunctive relief enjoining the U.S. from relocat-
ing plaintiffs or attempting to constrain their management of livestock and
housing. The court found that the plaintiffs' free exercise claims were fore-
closed by Lyng, which upheld facially neutral government actions that
threatened to impair or destroy religious exercise, for fear of creating "religious
servitudes" on government property. 1 36 The court noted that the analysis was
particularly compelling in this case, as protecting Navajo autonomy would limit
Hopi sovereignty. "The rights claimed by plaintiffs in Hopi lands are in total
derogation of Hopi rights in and to their reservation."
' 137
Agreement in Principle, 103d Cong. 103-47 (1993) (written testimony of Russell Lawrence
Barsh).
132 See Sub. Comm. Res. 1996/36, U.N. Sub.-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess. (Aug. 29, 1996); Final Report on the Study "Indigenous
Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," U.N. Sub-Comm. on Human
Rights, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2004/9 (2004); Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Soverreignty
over Natural Resources, Final Report of Erica-Irene A. Daes, U.N. Sub.-Comm. on Human
Rights, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July 13, 2004); Sub-Comm. Res.
1994/44, 46th Sess., U.N. Sub.-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 102-03 (Aug. 1994).
133 See Report by Special Rapporteur Abdelfattah Amor, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add. 1
(1998).
134 Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515, 1516 (D. Ariz. 1989).
135 Id. at 1516-17.
136 See Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
137 Manybeads, 730 F. Supp. at 1518.
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Regarding their equal protection claim, the plaintiffs reasoned that since
white settlers in prior cases were permitted to remain on public lands, while the
Indians who had used the land were awarded only monetary compensation,
Navajo families should likewise be allowed to remain. This claim, surprising
for a lawsuit seeking to uphold indigenous rights, was dismissed on the grounds
that this was a political decision by Congress. The court spent even less time
with the plaintiffs' international claims, which it termed frivolous. After assert-
ing that international law did not apply, the court concluded that in any case it
would not condemn a settlement designed to strike a balance between compet-
ing indigenous rights. It quoted Hamilton's description of the trade-off:
This is poor men against other poor men, fighting against a long historical backdrop
for an over-grazed, harsh, and inhospitable area which yields little above a subsis-
tence living. Both tribes have historical claims to the area, and both undoubtedly
have present economic need. Any solution is inevitably bound to cause suffering. The
Order of Compliance and implementation plans attempt to minimize the economic
dislocation caused the Navajo sheepherders, but the district court obviously cannot at
the same time implement the decree protecting Hopi interests and not visit hardships
on the Navajo, who presently use the entire area. 138
It went on to state "only the most partisan of advocates would argue that
the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act or subsequent amendments violate in
word or spirit the Genocide Implementation Act of 1987," and noted that the
Act created no enforceable rights.' 3 9 In a later opinion, the court dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. It was on appeal from that
decision that the Ninth Circuit ordered the mediation that produced the Accom-
modation Agreement.
The Manybeads plaintiffs came back before the Ninth Circuit in 2000,
resisting the Accommodation Agreement and challenging the constitutionality
of its predicate, the 1974 Settlement Act, on the basis of religious freedom.
The court affirmed the dismissal of the case after it found that the Hopi tribe,
which had refused to waive its sovereign immunity, was a necessary and indis-
pensable party. 1
40
The same result was reached in an earlier case, in which resisting families
attempted directly to challenge the 1996 Settlement. In Clinton v. Babbitt,
plaintiffs claimed the Settlement violated the equal protection clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 14 ' The court also affirmed the dismissal of this action on
the basis of Hopi sovereign immunity, though it noted in passing
the apparent lack of substance to the claim. First, the plaintiffs admit they are in the
unique position of being offered free leases to remain on land to which they have no
right, and fail to allege that they are being treated less favorably than any similarly
situated individuals. Second, even if the plaintiffs make the threshold showing of
disparate treatment they fail to show that this treatment is not rationally related to
legitimate legislative goals, such as the peaceful settlement of the Navajo-Hopi land
dispute. 142
138 Id. at 1521 (quoting Hamilton v. McDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 1974)).
139 Id.
140 See Manybeads v. United States, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000).
141 Clinton v. Babbit, 180 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
142 Id. at 1087.
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The Ninth Circuit acknowledged in both cases that the sovereign immu-
nity bar may prevent these plaintiffs' claims from ever being heard. 143 This
presents the question of whether the assertion of sovereign immunity by one
tribe may impermissibly infringe the rights of members of another. The answer
seems to be, like most answers in this dispute, a balance of the equities.
Congress has expressly limited the ability of incorporated tribes to exer-
cise their authority in ways that would violate certain fundamental rights.
144
Those rights relevant to the instant dispute include the free exercise of religion;
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures; freedom from takings without just
compensation; equal protection and due process. Although the language was
taken from the Bill of Rights, the interpretation of these rights is not the same
as that applied to actions taken by the state and federal governments. 45 Spe-
cifically, the limitation on tribal power should "be applied with recognition of
the tribe's unique cultural heritage, its experience in self-government, and the
disadvantages or burdens, if any, under which the tribal government was
attempting to carry out its duties."' 46 Individual rights should be balanced
against the right of tribal self-government. 147
Freedom of religion is well recognized as a fundamental right in interna-
tional law. The international community has endorsed it since the General
Assembly of the United Nations produced the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948.148 This right is echoed in the third article of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. However, many of the same
treaties that promote this right acknowledge that it may be limited by laws
"necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others."' 4 9 The Hopi, of course, claim that their interest
in sovereignty over lands long recognized as theirs is paramount. Self-determi-
nation by indigenous peoples is another fundamental right, recognized both by
the United Nations' 5° and by the Organization of American States.' 5 '
143 Id. at 1090; Manybeads, 209 F.3d at 1166.
144 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
145 See Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on other
grounds 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
146 Id. at 1150-51.
147 Id. at 1150.
148 Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, G.A. Res., U.N. GAOR 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684
(1981), art. 1(3).
149 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16136 (1967), art. 18(3).
15o See Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.41199512, EJCN.4ISub.211994156 (1994), art. 3: "Indigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development;" art. 31: "Indigenous peoples,
as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy
or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including ... social
welfare, economic activities, land and resource management, the environment and entry by
nonmembers .
' See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser/L/
V/.II.95, Doc. 6 (Feb. 26, 1997) art. XV: Right to Self Government: "Indigenous peoples
have the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
Fall 2004]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
The claims made by the Dann sisters may be levied here as well: the right
to equality before the law, the right to religious freedom and worship, the right
to property, the right to cultural integrity, the right to self-determination. The
American Declaration embraces the right of equality before the law, the right to
the inviolability of the home, and the right to a fair trial.' 52 The Preamble
emphasizes "it is the duty of man to preserve, practice and foster culture by
every means within his power." Yet it is not clear on whose behalf the claims
would weigh most heavily. Both sides have important religious and cultural
concerns at stake.
The interests here are significant and opposed. The Navajo families have
maintained a connection to this land that extends throughout the generations.
Family members are buried here, and traditionally the land passed on through
the family from mother to daughter.' 53 The land also represents a link to a
religious and cultural history that cannot, should not, be broken. As one of the
members of the holdout families reports,
Selling your life, that's what you're doing when you're relocating. You sell your
land and whatever you believe in, your parents' religion. You're even selling the
bones of your relatives .... I don't want it on my conscience that I sold everything
[the Holy People] put down for us way back in the beginning of time.
154
The resistors see themselves as caught between two laws: the obligation
to relocate, and the spiritual laws requiring them to remain. They see their
occupation as protecting the land against coal and other resource extraction.
Roberta Blackgoat, one of the more vocal of the resistors, asserted,
What we've been told is that you, the Din6 people are gonna sit on the Mother
Earth's liver and the heart and the lung [natural resources]. This is where you have
to hang on tight, real, real tight. This is what the sacred prayer and the sacred song is
telling you. Can't break it, can't leave it behind and go to another place. This is
gonna keep you here. You gonna be strong enough to hold this song and carry it on
to your children, grandchildren, on, on through the generations.
155
These individuals pledge "to stay there until they die, because that is
where they have lived forever. An important part of the Navajo cultural ethos
is that when they die they go back to the place where they are from." '15 6
Nevertheless, sovereignty is an important right in itself, and while the
Hopi have typically endorsed the settlement, they too have relinquished many
of the elements most important to them. They are still faced with the uncer-
tainty and indignity of watching others inhabit land they believe to be theirs.
During those lease terms they may not use that land, and it may be difficult to
control the Navajos' use. While they have jurisdiction to enforce tribal man-
social, spiritual and cultural development and accordingly, they have the right to autonomy
or self-government with regard to inter alia culture ... social welfare, economic activities,
land and resource management, the environment and entry by nonmembers ......
152 Id. arts. 11, IX, XVIII.
153 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 70, 79.
154 BENEDEK, supra note 40, at 90 (quoting Ella Hatathlie).
115 Quoted in B.J. Bergman, Wrong Side of the Fence, MOTHER JONES, Jan/Feb. 2000, at 68.
Claiming religious authority for their presence, she suggests that those in favor of relocation
of the traditionalist Navajo families should "sue the Creator." Id.; see also The Right to
Development, supra note 96.
256 Telephone interview with Herb Becker, (Mar. 2003) (on file with author).
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dates, the continued presence of families who have refused to enter into lease
terms demonstrates the practical limits of such rights. Friction has also arisen
over Hopi access to these lands.' 5 7 Finally, many Hopi resent the settlement's
insistence that they rely upon outside water pumped in from elsewhere while
the Peabody coal company depletes the aquifer they have traditionally relied
upon for their agriculture.' 5 8 The Hopi characterize the offer of the leases as a
gesture of goodwill that was offered "at great sacrifice to their interests." ''9
If brought before the Commission, these rights would have to be balanced,
just as they have been balanced domestically. It would surely influence the
analysis that this conflict has been extensively (and expensively) litigated, and
that the families were fully drawn into the settlement process. As described
above, the mediators made every possible effort to draw the families into the
negotiation process and to ensure that their perspective was included. And yet,
the second Manybeads case appealed the settlement, claiming that it did not
represent the families' interests. The plaintiffs asserted that the majority of the
families remaining on the HPL opposed the settlement, and signed the Accom-
modation Agreement only to protect their interests while continuing to pursue
the lawsuit.' 60 This raises the question of whether the families' voices were
indeed heard in the negotiations. The Dann case tells us that if they were not,
then the settlement might not be valid under international law.
The voices of the resisting families may have been somewhat muffled by
the participation of the Navajo tribe. The intermediary role of the Navajo
Nation was already at issue before the 1996 Settlement, where resistors seeking
to challenge range restoration measures were found not to have standing on
issues implicating tribal interests.' 6' The withdrawal of the Navajo Nation
from the process should remove these doubts, however.
Charges have also been leveled (by non-Hopi) that the Hopi tribal council
is influenced by the extraction industry and poorly represents the interests of its
traditionalist members, who are more sympathetic to HPL Navajos. In particu-
lar, many commentators have noted the questionable circumstances under
which the Hopi tribal government was constituted. Under the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, tribes were urged to create governments that mimicked the United
States' model. These were often ill-suited to indigenous cultures. The estab-
lishment of such governments may have been motivated at least in part by a
desire to open Indian lands to natural resources extraction, which a tribal gov-
ernment sympathetic to federal policy and susceptible to federal influence
157 Id.
158 See The Water Crisis, supra note 109.
'59 See Tutsqua Ancestral Land, supra note 38.
160 See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Manybeads (No. 00-0886) ("Prior to the fairness hearing,
only five of the eligible homesites had agreed to sign an agreement [but after being assured
that they could continue the appeal] .. .an additional seventy-seven (77) of the ninety-six
(96) eligible occupied homesites signed Agreements with the understanding that the Ninth
Circuit would decide Petitioners' constitutional challenge to the Relocation Act").
161 See Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990) (finding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to pursue free exercise claims regarding religious sites of significance to
the tribe as a whole or to litigate grazing rights, though they did have standing to litigate
religious claims regarding individual religious sites as well as claims concerning historical,
archeological, and cultural artifacts).
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could both authorize and legitimate. A sense of culturally determined idealism
undoubtedly also played a role. Oliver LaFarge, sent to create a Hopi Tribal
Council by John Collier, the BIA Commissioner under Franklin Roosevelt,
pushed acceptance of the new government against his better judgment and in
the face of opposition from the bulk of the tribe. The Council was ultimately
certified by Collier, despite heavy resistance by the village heads, because of a
final vote tally of 651 to 104 - with 1800 abstentions. LaFarge warned Collier
that abstention was a traditional method of showing opposition, but Collier,
eager to create an institution that he thought would protect Hopi interests and
culture, disregarded that advice.162 What resulted was a system of shadow
government, with the traditional and new leadership bodies coexisting uneasily.
Over time, these problems have abated. The tribe has worked out an
accommodation that allows the traditionalist leaders to register their opposition
within the system. Each village sends a representative to the Tribal Council.
The constitution requires that the Kikmongwi, or chief, of traditionalist villages
certify that village's representative. If the Council acts in a way the traditional-
ists do not approve, they may revoke their representative's certification, and the
Council may lose its quorum, and unable to conduct business.163 Generally,
reports of this process have been satisfactory. 164 That the Council has not dra-
matically changed the Hopi way of life is evidenced by the fact that traditional
culture remains quite strong.
16 5
It is important to note that there have been no specific allegations of HPL
Navajos' exclusion from the settlement process. Under the reasoning of the
Commission, the measures that were taken are probably enough. The Dann
case instructs that:
Articles XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration specially oblige a member
state to ensure that any determination of the extent to which indigenous claimants
maintain interests in the lands to which they have traditionally held title and have
occupied and used is based upon a process of fully informed and mutual consent on
the part of the indigenous community as a whole. 1
66
The court goes on to say, "This requires at a minimum that all of the
members of the community are fully and accurately informed of the nature and
consequences of the process and provided with an effective opportunity to par-
162 Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, The Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and
Endurance in the American Southwest, B.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 456-57 (1996).
163 Sekaquaptewa, supra note 35, at 765.
164 See id. at 783-84; telephone interview with Peter Steenland, supra note 66:
Hopi council members cannot run for office unless they have been approved by the most tradi-
tional and religious leaders of the Hopi tribe. As a result, when the Hopis were asked to make a
major concession to move the talks along, one or two council members would resign, thereby
depriving the Council of a quorum, and necessitating further consultation with the religious lead-
ers on the merits of the compromise before any movement could be achieved ... Legitimacy
wasn't a problem in Hopi. It was smaller, less populated, concentrated; everyone knows every-
one. It was also organized in accordance with religious societies. I analogized dealing with the
Hopi to dealing with a turtle. Wheni it got scared, it went in its shell, and if you kick it, it gets
more scared. These guys would quit. And then you'd wait months, reassure them, they'd have
another election, and boom - you were back in business.
165 Ragsdale, supra note 37, at 451-52.
166 Supra note 30, at 140.
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ticipate individually or as collectives."' 67 A finding of extinguishment of title
must be "based upon a judicial evaluation of pertinent evidence."1 68
The extensive litigation and the elaborate settlement process surely quali-
fies to meet these minimum standards. The Commission does not indicate what
more might be required, but it seems doubtful that it would find this case to
present a human rights violation. The resistors were included in the settlement,
but were uninterested in settling, for settling requires compromise, and they
have made clear that they will accept nothing short of complete control over the
land. 169 It is unlikely that the Commission will ratify this stance that the courts
all too familiar with the conflict have asserted is "in complete derogation of
Hopi rights." After all, the Commission prefers to leave "complex issues of
law and fact ... to the State for determination."' 7 ° In the end, it is best to leave
the resolution of this zero-sum game where it stands: with neither side facing a
complete loss. Any other solution may prove to be illusory for the simple fact
that each party wants the same thing: complete control over the same piece of
land.
IV. CONCLUSION: ADJUDICATING DIFFERENCE
What we hope these two stories illustrate is that the question of when
international law matters is not one that can be answered with reference to any
absolute principle. There are those occasions when as a matter of principle
domestic law ought to trump. Nonetheless, the overriding principle is fairness
to indigenous people, an issue on which international law is hardly silent. It is
these norms of fairness (both substantive and procedural norms) that ought to
be guiding principles in all Indian law disputes. As recent Supreme Court deci-
sions illustrate, thinking about tribes solely within the categories of ordinary
constitutional law does violence both to the efforts to define a constitutional
space for tribes that is consistent with our best values as well as to our commit-
ment to be part of an interlaced international legal system.
167 Id.
168 Id. at I 137.
169 See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Manybeads (No. 00-0886) ("Specifically, Navajo
residents of HPL object to the lack of a permanent right to remain on their sacred land, the
Hopi Tribe's prohibition on Navajo burials on HPL, limitations and restrictions on Navajo
grazing .... ")
170 Supra note 30, at 171.
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